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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-2955 
_____________ 
 
LANCE YARUS, D.O., 
                     Appellant                
 v. 
 
      WALGREEN CO.; 
WALGREEN EASTERN CO., INC.    
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2:14-cv-01656) 
District Judge: Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 16, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., RENDELL, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: June 13, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION*  
______________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 2 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Dr. Lance Yarus appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of appellees Walgreen Co. and Walgreen Eastern Co. Inc. (hereinafter 
“Walgreens”).  He contends that the District Court’s jury instructions and verdict sheet in 
this defamation suit were erroneous, warranting a new trial.  He also argues that the District 
Court erred by finding that his claims relating to two alleged defamatory statements were 
time-barred by Pennsylvania’s one-year statute of limitations.  For the reasons below, we 
will affirm the District Court’s rulings and orders.  
I. FACTS 
 
 Dr. Yarus is an orthopedic surgeon.  He brought this defamation suit in the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on November 26, 2013, alleging that Walgreens’s 
internal computer system, which provides pharmacists with information on prescribing 
physicians, contained the comment that he was “under investigation by the [Drug 
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)],” and that certain Walgreens pharmacists repeated 
this statement to his patients on five occasions.  App. 6.  
 First, on May 1, 2009, Caroline Bailey—a patient of Dr. Yarus—went to Walgreens 
and was informed by an unidentified pharmacist that Dr. Yarus was under investigation by 
the DEA.  Later that month, Dr. Yarus informed his then-counsel, Linda Shick, of the 
incident and told her that the Walgreens pharmacist would not fill the prescriptions that he 
had prescribed.  Shick subsequently wrote a letter to Walgreens about the incident and 
discussed the matter with Walgreens’s then-counsel, who told her that “the ‘remark’ [on 
 3 
 
the prescriber profile] . . . that Dr. Yarus was under investigation by the [DEA] . . . had 
been removed from the Walgreens’ computer . . . .”  App. 8.   
 Second, on July 23, 2010, another pharmacist at Walgreens refused to fill 
prescriptions for two of Dr. Yarus’s patients.  Dr. Yarus contends that a handwritten note 
recorded by one of Walgreens’s employees memorialized the conversation.  Id.  Shick then 
wrote an e-mail to another of Walgreens’s counsel, Brett Stacey, to advise him of the 
incident.  Stacey replied with an e-mail stating that “I have confirmed all comments have 
been removed.”  App. 9.   
 Third, on March 23, 2013, pharmacist Aunnee Loi refused to fill the prescription of 
another patient of Dr. Yarus, Damien Zajac.  According to Zajac, Loi stated that “Dr. Yarus 
is an irresponsible doctor who just writes scripts and probably does very little treating.”  
App. 10.  Fourth, Dr. Yarus contends that there was a publication of the defamatory 
statements on June 13, 2013.   
 Finally, on December 20, 2013, another Walgreens pharmacist refused to fill a 
prescription for another patient, Karen Gondos.  According to Gondos, during her 
deposition, the pharmacist told her that:  
We don’t fill this doctor’s prescriptions . . . there was just 
nobody going to fill it in the area – no chain stores like 
Walgreen[s], CVS, Rite Aid.  Nobody in the area fills his 
prescription. They feel he passes out too many pain pills . . . 
I’m not going to tell you that anybody is looking at him.  But 
the DEA wants us to report all prescriptions with him.  We 
can’t fill anything until we call him or he has to call us. 
 
App. 10-11.  
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 Walgreens removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  Walgreens then moved for summary judgment, which the District 
Court granted in part and denied in part.  The District Court granted summary judgment on 
all claims relating to the June 13, 2013 incident, finding that “[t]here is no evidence in the 
record about that day.”1  App. 10.  It also held that the defamation claims relating to the 
May 1, 2009 and July 23, 2010 incidents were time-barred by Pennsylvania’s one-year 
statute of limitations.  See 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5523(1).  However, the 
District Court denied summary judgment as to the claims arising from the March 23, 2013 
and the December 20, 2013 incidents.  It found that the alleged statements from those 
incidents were capable of defamatory meaning, and that there was a genuine dispute of 
material fact as to whether Zajac and Gondos understood their defamatory connotation.       
 At trial, and regarding the March 23, 2013 incident, the District Court formulated a 
question in its jury verdict sheet as follows: 
If you have found that on March 23, 2013, Walgreen[s] 
pharmacist Aunnee Loi made a comment to patient Damien 
Zajac pertaining to plaintiff, do you find that plaintiff Lance 
Yarus has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
comment constituted a false statement of fact, rather than a 
statement of opinion.    
 
App. 236a (Jury Verdict Sheet).  Dr. Yarus did not object to this formulation.  The District 
Court proffered a similar question on the jury verdict sheet regarding the December 20, 
2013 incident:    
If you have found that a comment to patient Karen Gondos 
pertaining to plaintiff was made on either December 20, 2013 
                                              
1 Dr. Yarus does not challenge this holding on appeal. 
 5 
 
by Walgreen[s] pharmacist Abby Rosina . . . do you find that 
plaintiff Lance Yarus has proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the statement constituted a false statement of 
fact, rather than a statement of opinion. 
 
App. 238a.  Dr. Yarus also did not object to this question.  At trial, Walgreens’s primary 
theory of the case was that its pharmacists did not utter the alleged defamatory statements.  
The jury ultimately found for Walgreens, and returned a verdict against Dr. Yarus on both 
defamation claims.  He timely appealed.    
II. DISCUSSION2 
 
 On appeal, Dr. Yarus raises several objections to the District Court’s jury 
instructions and verdict sheet, as well as to its decision to grant summary judgment on his 
defamation claims relating to the May 1, 2009 and July 23, 2010 incidents. We will affirm 
the District Court’s rulings and orders. 
A.  JURY INSTRUCTIONS  
 
 On appeal, Dr. Yarus objects to the District Court’s decision to have the jury 
determine whether the alleged false statements were false statements of fact rather than 
statements of opinion.  Indeed, Dr. Yarus is correct that “[w]hether a particular statement 
is opinion or fact is a question of law for the trial court.”  Green v. Mizner, 692 A.2d 169, 
174 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).  He also contends that the jury instructions placed the burden on 
him to prove falsity of the defamatory statement.  However, because he did not object to 
the instructions below, we must review the District Court’s decision for plain error.  See 
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and we have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(1)(A) (“[A] party may assign as error: . . . an error in an instruction 
actually given, if that party properly objected” (emphasis added)). Under this standard, 
“we will reverse the trial court only where a plain error was ‘fundamental and highly 
prejudicial, such that the instructions failed to provide the jury with adequate guidance and 
our refusal to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.’” Franklin 
Prescriptions, Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 424 F.3d 336, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Ryder v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 136 (3d Cir. 1997)).  
 Although the questions in the verdict sheet were legally incorrect, their inclusion as 
instructions to the jury did not constitute plain error.  See Fashauer v. N.J. Transit Rail 
Operations, Inc., 57 F.3d 1269, 1288–89 (3d Cir. 1995) (incorrect instruction as to burden 
of proof in a civil case not plainly erroneous); Dunn v. HOVIC, 1 F.3d 1371, 1378 (3d Cir. 
1993) (declining to consider whether jury instruction was defective under Virgin Islands 
law because “th[e] issue was not properly preserved for appeal under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 51”).  We have stated:  
[W]hile ordinarily an [i]ncorrect jury instruction as to burden 
of proof is fundamental and highly prejudicial and requires a 
new trial, that principle assumes that the issue properly has 
been preserved for appeal. . . .  
 
We repeatedly have stressed the important policy objectives 
served by Rule 51. The rule affords the trial judge an 
opportunity to correct any error that may have been made in 
the charge before the jury begins its deliberations. It also 
lessen[s] the burden on appellate courts by diminishing the 
number of rulings at the trial which they may be called upon to 
review. Thus, Rule 51 is consistent with the general rule that 
an appellate court will not predicate error on an issue upon 
which the district court was not provided with an opportunity 
to rule. We have followed this proposition strictly, and have 
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refused to consider newly developed arguments[s] concerning 
[a] jury charge deficiency.  
 
Fashauer, 57 F.3d at 1288–89 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  We 
therefore decline to grant Dr. Yarus relief because the flaws in the jury verdict sheet did 
not amount to plain error.3   
B. WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
  
Dr. Yarus argues that he should be afforded a new trial because the weight of the 
evidence provides that he clearly met his burden to prove that the alleged statements were 
a false statement of fact and not an opinion.  “[N]ew trials because the verdict is against 
the weight of the evidence are proper only when the record shows that the jury’s verdict 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be 
overturned or shocks our conscience.”  Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 
1353 (3d Cir. 1991).  Here, the Walgreens pharmacists who allegedly made the defamatory 
comments testified that they did not do so, thereby creating a genuine dispute of material 
fact as to whether the alleged statements were actionable to begin with, and which the jury 
                                              
3 Dr. Yarus also contends that the jury instructions were erroneously confusing because a 
reviewing court is unable “to determine if the jury found that Plaintiff failed to prove that 
the Pharmacists made false statements of fact to Plaintiff’s patients . . . or whether the jury 
found that their statements were protected opinion . . .”  Appellant Br. at 44.  Assuming 
arguendo that this was error, it was harmless because either finding would compel the jury 
to find for Walgreens.  See Hill v. Reederei F. Laeisz G.M.B.H., Rostock, 435 F.3d 404, 
411 (3d Cir. 2006) (error in jury instruction harmless if “the error did not affect the outcome 
of the case” (quoting Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 349 (3d Cir. 2005))). 
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resolved as reflected in its verdict.  The result therefore did not “shock [the] conscience” 
and was not against the weight of the evidence.4  Id.  
C.  BURDEN OF PROOF 
 
 “Truth is an affirmative defense under Pennsylvania law.”  Tucker v. Fischbein, 237 
F.3d 275, 287 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 42 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8343(b)(1)).  On 
appeal, Dr. Yarus contends that the District Court erred by refusing to give an instruction 
that Walgreens had the burden of proving truth – according to him, this omission implicitly 
led to requiring him to prove falsity of the defamatory statement.  However, we apply plain 
error review because Dr. Yarus did not make an objection to the District Court, thereby 
waiving his right to assign error on appeal.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(1)(B) (“A party may 
assign as error: . . . a failure to give an instruction, if that party properly requested it and—
unless the court rejected the request in a definitive ruling on the record—also properly 
objected.” (emphasis added)).  Here, Walgreens did not substantially advance at trial the 
theory that Dr. Yarus was actually being investigated by the DEA – rather, its primary 
theory was that the alleged defamatory statements were never spoken.  The instruction was 
therefore unnecessary and its omission had no effect on the burden of proof – indeed, its 
excision was far from plain error.  See United States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 893, 897 (3d Cir. 
1994) (plain error in jury instruction occurs when error “affected the outcome of the 
District Court proceedings” (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993))).  
                                              
4 On appeal, Dr. Yarus included an alleged copy of the jury verdict sheet answered by the 
jury which purports that the jury found that the pharmacists made the comments in 
question.  However, we decline to credit this alleged copy as evidence of the jury’s findings 
because it is neither signed nor dated by the jury foreperson.  
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 D. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
 Finally, Dr. Yarus argues that the District Court erred in holding that the defamation 
claims relating to the May 1, 2009 and July 23, 2010 incidents were time-barred by 
Pennsylvania’s one-year statute of limitations.  According to him, the limitations period 
was tolled by the doctrine of fraudulent concealment because Walgreens’s counsel’s 
reassurance that the remarks on his prescriber profile had been removed “caused [Dr. 
Yarus] to relax his vigilance” and therefore prevented him from learning about the 
subsequent defamatory statements.  Appellant Br. at 47.  “[W]e employ a plenary standard 
in reviewing orders entered on motions for summary judgment, applying the same standard 
as the district court.” Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 We find this argument to be specious.  Here, Dr. Yarus’s complaint is clear that his 
counsel wrote to Walgreens about the May 1, 2009 comment on May 7, 2009, and about 
the May 23, 2010 comment on July 26, 2010.  By his own admission, Dr. Yarus was aware 
of the alleged defamatory comments on these dates, meaning that the statute of limitations 
would have expired at the latest on May 7, 2010 and July 26, 2011, respectively.  Dr. Yarus 
did not commence this action until November 26, 2013, or well outside the one-year 
limitations period.  We therefore will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment.   
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s rulings and 
orders. 
